The Indian air force completed seven decades of existence on October 8, 2002. From the low-flying and slow Wapitis to the Sukhoi-30 MKIs inducted in September this year, the IAF has come a long way. On this occasion, the air force must look back to learn from its past mistakes as well as look ahead to face the geopolitical reality of hostility. Indeed, the role of the IAF in defending India has never been more complicated and difficult than it is today.

What difficulties does the IAF face and how will it deal with them? The first is that of age — 34 of the 40 combat squadrons of the IAF are ageing. At present, only 2 squadrons of the Sukhoi-30 (inducted from 1996 onwards), 2 squadrons of the “middle-aged” Mirage-2000 (in operation since 1986) and 3 squadrons of the MiG-29, which have been operational for almost 15 years, are relatively new; the rest — the MiG 23BNs and MFs, Jaguars, MiG 27Ms, the various MiG21s like the PFMA, FL and the upgraded BIS — are all more than 20 years old, some even crossing the 3-decade threshold. Yet all these aircraft are intrinsic to India’s ground and air defence. Thus, it is imperative that the IAF undertake fleet modernization or upgradation, and augment or replace aircraft where needed.

Enemies everywhere

But can India afford to replace over 500 aircraft? Even if it can, where would the IAF procure so many aircraft in a market of shrinking producers and exorbitant price tags?

But with state-of-the-art combat aircraft like Sukhoi-3-MKI in our arsenal, do we need any more? But 2 squadrons of about 20 Sukhoi-30 MKIs each cannot constitute the air defence of a vast country like India facing a hostile Pakistan, an unfriendly China and rebel-infested Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives.

What then are the strategic threats to the IAF? Is Pakistan, with its 353 aircraft, including 18 combat squadrons, a threat to the 40 squadron, 738 fighter IAF ?

Statistically and theoretically, the Pakistani air force is no match for the IAF and China presents only an indirect threat since its primary interest is in east Asia. However, a potential danger to the IAF is the 120 Sukhoi-27s and Sukhoi-30s China possesses. It will not be surprising if after the induction of the Sukhoi-30 MKI in September, Pakistan secretly decides to induct a few of these Chinese Sukhoi in its air force. The Sino-Pak arms axis has become a strategic threat to the Indian armed forces.

Danger pockets

There may be no immediate prospects of a Pakistani air offence against India, but the situation can change anytime given the country’s trigger-happy military high command which lacks the steadying influence of an elected political leadership. At least 11 squadrons of the Pakistan air force are of Chinese origin. The Pakistanis also do not have the problem of spares with the Chinese machines, as India has with the Russian equipment in its inventory.

What is the future of the IAF? The presence of the Sukhoi-30 MKIs will make Pakistan pressure the United States of America to part with some of its latest war birds to achieve “parity” with India. For the US, helping Pakistan makes geo-political sense. It has a professional military which is amenable to the US, witness the cooperation of the two forces against the Islamic fundamentalists. It is also the gateway to Kabul, the Caspian Sea and the oil reserves of Kazakhstan. Pakistan, sooner or later, is bound to get what it wants.

Today, after 70 long years of flying, the IAF is clearly faced with many tough challenges. With an ageing fleet, slow replenishment and even slower modernization, difficulty in sourcing spares, a high rate of attrition, a hostile neighbour and the US’s indifference to India’s security concerns, the IAF has no option but to go it alone. Its future depends on its own ability. But wars cannot be fought on external charity or by proxy. Any air war the IAF wages too cannot be an exception to this.