Barely a week after he announced a joint anti-terrorism mechanism with Pakistan, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has claimed that this was a “test” to see whether Pakistan was willing to end its support to terrorism.

A joint mechanism with Pakistan to counter terrorism is not undesirable. Nor can one claim that Pakistan itself is not a victim of terrorism. The more important questions are: should the joint mechanism be put into place after evidence of cooperation from Pakistan or before as a measure of such a “test”? And is Pakistan a victim of the forward thrust of terrorism as India is or its blowback? If answers to these questions are fudged, then public opinion in India would be left confused about where our own war against terror is headed.

In principle, there are many advantages of a cooperative approach to fighting terrorism. India and Pakistan need to think of tangible ways of reassuring the other of its security. To begin with, the two countries could sign an extradition treaty. Both nations have such treaties with remote countries but not between them. The two neighbours have no reason to protect criminals either. Both can have formal and informal exchange of information between their intelligence agencies. As of now, both share information with third countries but not with each other. The two sides can provide Action Taken Reports to each other. Even if no action is taken, sometimes merely taking cognizance of certain activities and individuals is enough to build confidence.

There can be a variety of symbolic actions that can be initiated — jointly fighting money laundering, terrorists, counterfeiters and other criminals — based on the assumption that criminals can neither secure India nor Pakistan. If a criminal wanted in India is handed over by Pakistan, or even if one infiltrator trying to cross the border is shot dead by the Pakistan army or information provided to India about how the Pakistani security forces have arrested a terrorist cell trying to plan disruptive action on this side of the border, then that would have a tremendous political impact in India.

Such joint cooperation would help invalidate perceptions of each other conditioned by past experience. Evidence of action on the ground could pave the way for genuine reconciliation. A joint anti-terrorist mechanism would then be both viable and desirable.There would be no question then of the charge of surrendering national interest being levelled against the government now. After all, if the two foreign secretaries are talking and the two home secretaries can meet, why cannot the two intelligence chiefs meet when their objectives are the same? If we want peace, why should our generals meet only on the battlefield? Let them meet over coffee instead and consult each other. Something good is bound to come of it.

A joint mechanism against terrorism can, therefore, come at the end of an understanding between India and Pakistan. But it cannot be the point of departure in a situation of a huge trust-deficit. A joint mechanism to fight terrorism cannot also be a “test” for the other side. It should already have been the outcome of many such tests, probably outside the public eye, which would have generated sufficient confidence in the government to go ahead with it.

Unfortunately, the optics of the current situation do not seem right. As a consequence of the Mumbai blasts, the foreign secretary level talks were interrupted because Pakistan was not seen to be acting in good faith. Then, without any ostensible reason, the entire diplomatic effort swings the other way. Where was the demonstration of good faith that prompted this change?

Could this be a purely cosmetic exercise that India takes Pakistan at its face value about not supporting terrorism and wants to enter into arrangements that it has with several other countries and sets up a Joint Working Group on terrorism? But such a cynical exercise will not lead to any genuine sharing of actionable evidence. Nor would it lead to anything except bland denials and counter-accusations. The Pakistan foreign office has already claimed that the mechanism would not be used to hand over wanted criminals and, in any case, Kashmiri militants are ‘freedom fighters’.

There can be little doubt that India has come worse off from Havana because it has handed over a diplomatic victory to Pakistan. Pakistan’s position as a state against terrorism has been reinforced because its chief victim, India, has accepted that it has been acting in good faith; that it was also a victim of terrorism.

However, there are two distinct varieties of terrorism involved here. Unlike India, Pakistan is a victim of the blowback of terrorism that it promoted against the West and against India. The assassination attempts on Musharraf are not a result of terrorism promoted from outside — Pakistan sowed a wind of terror and is now reaping a whirlwind.

There can be no joint mechanism with India to deal with the blowback effects of terrorism in Pakistan. Neither the terrorists targeting Musharraf nor their extremist ideology is the natural constituency of India.

In fact, it is Musharraf who is crucially dependent, besides the army, on the religious political forces in his country. Currently, there is a disequilibrium in his relationship with the religious forces as he seeks to balance the support of the United States of America with his domestic sources of legitimacy. The terrorist blowback in Pakistan is due to the changes forced in Musharraf’s domestic and neighbourhood policies, especially towards Afghanistan, by the Americans.

However, Manmohan Singh has given Islamabad the international diplomatic cover that the US might have been called upon to give it. The prime minister is willing to trust him and said after meeting him in Havana, “General Musharraf has assured me that Pakistan will have no hand in perpetuating terrorism.” This is the same Musharraf who had denied that Pakistan army regulars were involved in Kargil, but now claims in his autobiography that the entire operation was meticulously planned in advance and units of the Pakistan army fought in Kargil. He is a military dictator who lies through his teeth and whose diplomatic utterances are based entirely on tactical needs.

Why then did India opt for the Havana joint statement? The answer has to do with what both Indian politics and diplomacy have become. Indian political leaders need, for electoral and international reasons, to periodically show success in normalizing ties with Pakistan. Diplomats, however experienced they might be, get a sense that the political leadership wants to show progress with Pakistan and start packaging various kinds of moves to that end. Sometimes, they may themselves start believing that Musharraf is half-sincere in dealing with terrorism, that he combines civil and military authority and may be able to settle all disputes which a democratically elected leadership may find difficult to accomplish. They help create a mindset that Musharraf can be trusted in his new avatar.

The net result is what we are seeing: diplomatic success is gifted to the other side with no hope of getting any cooperation.