New Delhi, Aug. 17: The Indo-US nuclear deal has already acquired such a momentum of its own that if the government bows to the Left and stops “operationalising’’ the deal, it may end up virtually killing the pact.

President George W. Bush’s rapidly waning popularity means that his administration will practically become lame-duck after the US Congress returns from its December recess.

Under the circumstances, the US Congress must pass the deal in a “yes-no’’ (up-down) vote by mid-December. Analysts say this is the last of three steps that will make the deal fully operational.

The other two steps are related to talks between Delhi (the department of atomic energy and the foreign ministry) and the International Atomic Energy Agency on negotiating an India-specific safeguards agreement.

Simultaneously, Delhi’s emissaries have already begun talking to 45 countries that are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group for an Indian waiver.

The Prime Minister’s special envoy, Shyam Saran, has been on the road for the past week, visiting Russia and Germany, after which he goes to Brazil and Argentina.

If the Left refuses to soften its stand on “operationalising’’ the deal and if the government ends up accepting the demand for the sake of saving itself, the easiest way out would be to opt for a go-slow approach.

The danger, however, is that if the US Congress doesn’t pass the deal by mid-December, it is as good as dead. There can be no middle path.

Significantly, even as the Left debates the crisis, its views are near identical to several non-proliferation hawks within the US establishment. They believe the Bush administration has virtually destroyed the architecture of non-proliferation by making an exception for India.

Non-proliferation hawk Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, Washington DC, said: “At the very least, the Bush administration should not make it easier for Delhi to resume nuclear testing and to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. It appears that the 123 Agreement fails to meet the minimal standards as well as the clear requirements established in the Hyde Act.”

Nuclear expert Robert Einhorn added: “Mr Bush, eager to place relations with India on a new footing, waived many of the restrictions in order to sign the initial deal.… Now we’ve gone beyond that and given India something that we don’t give Russia and China.’’

Back home, former ambassador to Bangladesh Deb Mukherjee said the perception that India was not averse to becoming a junior partner of the US was growing. By inviting the USS Nimitz to anchor in Indian waters and by voting against Iran at the IAEA, such a perception was gathering pace in the region, too, he added.

Mukherjee said he had been asked by people in Bangladesh whether India was becoming the US “chowkidar’’ in the region.