If a nuclear-armed Muslim country, battling high inflation and depleted foreign exchange reserves, faces the additional problem of ceaseless suicide attacks and intimidation by terrorists, then it surely deserves a closer look by those in the vicinity.

Indeed, it was quite shocking to read a media report in November which stated that nearly 2,000 police personnel have resigned from their jobs in the wake of the growing number of terror strikes in various parts of Pakistan, while more than 160 have perished so far in attacks in the North West Frontier Province alone.

What is most disturbing for the State is that the police seem disinterested in performing their duties in the disturbed areas. The police’s failure means that they would be replaced by the paramilitary forces. In case they failed as well, the army appears to be the last resort. And here lies the real danger for Pakistan, once again. The Pakistan army is lying low at present after Pervez Musharraf’s disastrous reign. But if things spin out of control for the civilian government only two things can happen: the demise of a united Pakistan or the reappearance of the army on the political scene to stem the rot.

General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, knows that the Pakistan army may find it difficult to overcome the challenge posed by suicide bombers in an anarchic future. He cannot possibly forget that on March 16, 2004 , a massive operation against al Qaida militants in Kalosha village ended in a monumental blunder. The Peshawar-based XI corps commander, lieutenant general Ali Jan Orakzai, committed the under-armed and poorly trained Frontier Corps, an 8,000-strong paramilitary force made up of Pashtun tribesmen, to a battle with no air support and little intelligence.The result was on expected lines: the heavy casualties thoroughly demoralized the ranks and dozens of soldiers deserted their units rather than kill fellow Pashtuns.

Blood brothers

That the Pakistan army had been vanquished was evident when an agreement was worked out with the militants at Shakai on April 24, 2004. The defeat resulted in enhanced troop deployment to South Waziristan. However, this was followed by another capitulation in the form of a peace deal in November and by the end of the year, the army had lost more than 600 soldiers in one single region.

A vicious cycle of surrender also emerged. The en masse surrender of soldiers in July and in August, last year, forced Musharraf to comment on their unprofessionalism. The Pashtun Muslim soldiers of Pakistan had lost the courage and the conviction to fight against their brethren. The shared ethnic background and cultural ties between the soldiers and militants became a problem for the army.

However, the dilemma faced by Pakistani troops is not their own making. Nor are they the only ones to face the fire and the fury of the Pashtun fraternity. Across the Pak-Afghan Durand Line, American and British soldiers as well as those hailing from other European countries are facing the same degree of hostility.

When they ruled the subcontinent, the British left the tribals of Pakistan and Afghanistan to their own fate after an unprecedented battering of British soldiers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Kabul and Kandahar. Nearly 200 years ago, an elderly Afghan tribal told the diplomat, Mountstuart Elphinstone, this: “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood. But we will never be content with a master.” This still seems to hold true and the resignation of 2,000 Pakistani policemen is understandable. Little appears to have changed and luckily for India, the Durand Line lies some distance from it.