Relief and euphoria inevitably cloud reason. The liberation of Mumbai from a terrorist siege has justifiably produced relief, and praise for the forces that engaged the terrorists in battle. But this should not stop the posing of some very uncomfortable questions. Despite all that has been revealed the issue of intelligence failure cannot be brushed aside. Either the various intelligence agencies did not have adequate and concrete information, or those who take crucial decisions neglected the inputs of the agencies. Both are serious allegations. Yet no one, save a home minister known for his utter incompetence even before the attack on Mumbai, has been held accountable. Another thing that is obvious is that the police and the NSG were singularly unprepared in terms of resources and equipment to counter the menace that they faced. This could be one reason why the quelling of the assault took over 60 hours in spite of the fact that, according to reports, only 10 terrorists had come into Mumbai. Out of these, one had been arrested and the other killed before the NSG began their operation. The incongruity in numbers between the two sides is too glaring to be ignored. There is reason to fear at the speculation about what could have happened had the number of terrorists been greater.

What will remain an enigma is why the head of the Maharashtra anti-terrorist squad, Hemant Karkare, was in the midst of battle. There is a strong argument that as the leader he should have guided the operations instead of being a hero at the front. His death could not have been a boost to the morale of his men. Similarly, why three important policemen, in the middle of an encounter, should travel in the same car is also beyond comprehension. What has not emerged is whether during the operation technology was used to discover where actually the terrorists were located in the hotels and in Nariman House. The general impression is that the NSG went in with a great deal of courage and heroism but they were not equipped with a proper plan or adequate intelligence and equipment. The result may have been a longer encounter and a greater loss of lives than was actually necessary. As mentioned earlier, these are not comfortable questions, but they need to be asked so that if, heaven forbid, there is a next time, the preparations will be better and more prompt.